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Abstract. In this paper we shall relate computational complexity to the
principle of natural selection. We shall do this by giving a philosophical
account of complexity versus universality.
It seems sustainable to equate universal systems to complex systems or
at least to potentially complex systems. Post’s problem on the existence
of (natural) intermediate degrees (between decidable and universal Σ01)
then finds its analog in the Principle of Computional Equivalence (PCE).
In this paper we address possible driving forces –if any– behind PCE.
Both the natural aspects as well as the cognitive ones are investigated.
We postulate a principle GNS that we call the Generalized Natural Se-
lection principle that together with the Church-Turing thesis is seen to
be in close correspondence to a weak version of PCE.
Next, we view our cognitive toolkit in an evolutionary light and postulate
a principle in analogy with Fodor’s language principle.
In the final part of the paper we reflect on ways to provide circumstantial
evidence for GNS by means of theorems, experiments or, simulations.
Keywords: computational complexity, intermediate degrees, Principle
of Computational Equivalence, natural selection, dynamical systems
1 Complexity and computation
It is a standard definition in the literature to call a computational process Π
universal if it can simulate any other computational process Θ. In other words, Π
is universal if (see for example [2] or any other basic text book on computability
theory) for any other computational process Θ, we can find an easy coding
protocol C and decoding protocol C−1 so that we can encode any input x for
Θ as an input C(x) for Π so that after Π has performed its computation we
can decode the answer Π(C(x)) to the answer that Θ would have given us. In
symbols: C−1(Π(C(x))) = Θ(x).
One can formalize what it means for a protocol to be easy but for the sake of
this presentation that is not too relevant. Thus, if a process is universal, it can
mimic all other processes if we just prepare the right input for it. It is certainly
part of our intuition that complex systems can incorporate, mimic, or use, less
complex systems. In this light it seems sustainable to define complex systems
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as those systems that are universal. Note that under this definition a complex
system need not necessarily manifest itself in a complex appearance: a universal
process can mimic any other process whence also the very easy ones.
2 Intermediate degrees
In this section we study the complexity that falls in between decidable and
universal in a sense to be specified below.
2.1 Turing degrees
For sets of natural numbers, the notion of universality can also be defined. Con-
trary to real-world computations, for sets of natural numbers there are infinitely
many ever-increasing notions of universality. The one that corresponds to the
computational notion is that of Σ01 universality. A set K is called Σ
0
1 -universal
if for any computably enumerable set X (that is a set whose values we can com-
putably enumerate but not necessarily decide for each number if it is in the set
or not) there is a computable function fX : N→ N so that
x ∈ X ⇐⇒ fX(x) ∈ K.
We call such a function fX also a reduction. Post [10] raised the famous ques-
tion of whether there is some natural computably enumerable set of natural
numbers that is computationally more informative than a decidable set, but less
informative than the universal set K.
Often, instead of speaking of sets directly one considers degrees also called
Turing degrees. A Turing degree can be considered as the entity of all the sets
that contain the same amount of information in the sense of the above considered
reduction. Thus, two sets X and Y fall in the same degree –we write X ∼ Y –
whenever there is some computable f : X → Y such that x ∈ X ⇔ f(x) ∈ Y
and some computable g : Y → X such that y ∈ Y ⇔ g(y) ∈ X. For two Turing
degrees X and Y we write X < Y to indicate that there is some computable
f : X → Y such that x ∈ X ⇔ f(x) ∈ Y but no computable g : Y → X such
that y ∈ Y ⇔ g(y) ∈ X.
It is common practice to denote the degree of decidable sets by ∅ and the
degree of Σ01 -universal sets by ∅′. Post’s question stated in terms of degrees now
translates to whether there exists some degree X which falls strictly in between
∅ and ∅′ in terms of the above defined reduction, that is ∅ < X < ∅′. It took the
scientific community twelve years to find such an intermediate degree. However,
it is generally held that this solution does not provide a natural intermediate
degree.
Clearly the notion of being natural is rather vague and auto-determined by
the scientific community itself. A clear indication for a mathematical notion to
be natural is that it occurs in various other fields as well. Likewise, applicability
to other kind of problems or admitting different proof methods are typically
also considered an indication of naturalness. The canonical way of finding inter-
mediate degrees is by what are called priority arguments with finite injury and
it is generally held that they do not meet the above mentioned indications for
being natural. We refer the reader to [13] for a more detailed account of priority
arguments in the context of this paper.
2.2 Church-Turing thesis and PCE
Post’s question on intermediate degrees finds it real-world analog in the Principle
of Computational Equivalence (PCE) which was postulated by Wolfram in his
NKS book [14]:
PCE: Almost all processes that are not obviously simple can be viewed
as computations of equivalent and maximal sophistication.
The processes here referred to are processes that occur in nature, or at least,
processes that could in principle be implemented in nature. Thus, processes that
require some oracle or black box that give the correct answer to some hard
questions are of course not allowed here.
As noted in the book, PCE implies the famous Church-Turing Thesis (again,
see [2] for more details) (CT):
CT: Everything that is algorithmically computable is computable by a
Turing Machine.
Both theses –PCE and CT– have some inherent vagueness in that they try
to capture/define an intuitive notion. While the CT thesis aims at defining the
intuitive notion of algorithmic computability,PCE aims at defining what degrees
of complexity occur in natural processes. But note, this is not a mere definition
as, for example, the notion of what is algorithmically computable comes with a
clear intuitive meaning. And thus, the thesis applies to all such systems that fall
under our intuitive meaning.
As a consequence, the CT thesis would become false if some scientists were
to point out an algorithmic computation that cannot be performed on a Turing
Machine with unlimited time and space resources. With the development and
progress of scientific discovery the thesis has to be questioned and tested time
and again. And this is actually what we have seen over the past decades with the
invention and systematic study of new computational paradigms like DNA com-
puting [9], quantum computing [8], membrane computing [1], etc. Most scientists
still adhere to the CT thesis.
But the PCE says more. It says that the space of possible degrees of com-
putational sophistication between obviously simple and universal is practically
void. In what follows we shall address the question what might cause this. We
put forward two observations. First we formulate a natural candidate principle
that can account for PCE and argue for its plausibility. Second, we shall briefly
address how cognition can be important. In particular, the way we perceive, in-
terpret and analyze our environment could be such that in a natural way it will
not focus on intermediate degrees even if they were there.
3 Complexity and Evolution
In this section we shall dwell on the intimate relation between evolution and the
emergence of complexity. We shall follow [6] in great lines citing certain passages
but also adding new insights.
In various contexts but in particular in evolutionary processes one employs
the principle of Natural Selection, often also referred to as Survival of the Fittest.
These days basically everyone is familiar with this principle. It is often described
as species being in constant fight with each other over a limited amount of
resources. In this fight only those species that outperform others will have access
to the limited amount of resources, whence will be able to pass on its reproductive
code to next generations causing the selection.
We would like to generalize this principle to the setting of computations.
This leads us to what we call the principle of Generalized Natural Selection:
GNS: In nature, computational processes of high computational sophis-
tication are more likely to maintain/abide than processes of lower com-
putational sophistication provided that sufficiently many resources are
around to sustain the processes.
If one sustains the view that all natural processes can be viewed as com-
putational ones, this generalization is readily made. For a computation, to be
executed, it needs access to the three main resources space, matter, and time. If
now one computation outperforms the other, it will win the battle over access to
the limited resources and abide. What does outperform mean in this context?
Say we have two neighboring processesΠ1 andΠ2 that both need resources to
be executed. Thus,Π1 andΠ2 will interfere with each other. Stability of a process
is thus certainly a requirement for survival. Moreover, if Π1 can incorporate, or
short-cut Π2 it can actually use Π2 for its survival. As an analogy we mention a
monkey that can predict and thereby use the behavior of an ant by inserting a
stick into an ant colony waiting for ants to climb on the stick so that the monkey
can eat the ants by pulling the stick out again.
A generalization of incorporating, or short-cutting is given by the notion of
simulation that we have given above. Thus, if Π1 can simulate Π2, it is more
likely to survive. In other words, processes that are of higher computational
sophistication are likely to outperform and survive processes of lower computa-
tional sophistication. In particular, if the process Π1 is universal, it can simulate
any other process Π2 and thus is likely to use or incorporate any such process
Π2.
Of course this is merely a heuristic argument or an analogy rather than
a conclusive argument for the GNS principle. One can think of experimental
evidence where universal automata in the spirit of the Game of Life are run next
to and interacting with automata that generate regular or repetitive patterns to
see if, indeed, the more complex automata are more stable than the repetitive
ones. In setting up such experiments, much care needs to be taken to not run into
hard philosophical problems of ontological nature like the question ”what are the
defining properties of a particular process”. One can think of similar questions
about a tree without leaves still being a tree etc. In particular, it seems more
sensible to focus on some particular features, like for example entropy or other
complexity measures. We will take up these considerations in more detail in
Section 5.
Of course, one cannot expect that experiments and circumstantial evidence
can substitute or prove the principle. A more detailed discussion of the principle
can be found in [6]
Just like the theory of the selfish gene (see [4]) shifted the scale on which nat-
ural selection was to be considered, now GNS is an even more drastic proposal
and natural selection can be perceived to occur already on the lowest possible
level: individual small-scale computational processes.
In [6] it was noted that under some reasonable circumstances we may see
GNS as a consequence of PCE. However, GNS only talks about computational
processes in nature and not in full generality about computational processes
either artificial or natural as was the case in PCE. Thus we cannot expect that
CT+GNS is actually equivalent to PCE. However, if we restrict PCE to talk
only about processes in nature, let us denote this by PCE′, then we do argue
that we can expect a correspondence. That is:
PCE′ ≈ CT + GNS.
But PCE′ tells us that almost all computational processes in nature are either
simple or universal. If we have GNS we find that more sophisticated processes
will outperform simpler ones and CT gives us an attainable maximum. Thus
the combination of them would yield that in the limit all processes end up
being complex. The question then arises, where do simple processes come from?
(Normally, the question is where do complex processes come from, but in the
formal setting of CT+GNS it is the simple processes that are in need of further
explanation.)
Simple processes in nature often have various symmetries. As we have argued
above these symmetries are readily broken when a simple system interacts with
a more complex one resulting in the simple system being absorbed in the more
complex one. We see two main forces that favor simple systems.
The first driving force is what we may call cooling down. For example, temper-
ature/energy going down, or material resources growing scarce. If these resources
are not available, the complex computations cannot continue their course, break-
ing down and resulting in less complex systems.
A second driving force may be referred to as scaling and invokes mechanisms
like the Central Limit Theorem. The Central Limit Theorem is a phenomenon
that creates symmetry by repeating a process with stochastic outcome a large
number of times yielding the well-known Gaussian distribution. Thus the scale
(number of repetitions) of the process determines the amount of symmetry that
is built up by phenomena that invoke the Central Limit Theorem.
In analogy, we can mention that whilst various universal processes that are
executed at cell level, a tree by itself can hardly be called a universal computa-
tional process.
In the above, we have identified a driving force that creates complexity
(GNS) and two driving forces that creates simplicity: cooling down and scal-
ing. In the light of these two opposite forces we can restate PCE′ as saying
that simplicity and universality are the two main attractors of these interacting
forces.
Note that we deliberately do not speak of an equivalence between PCE′ and
CT + GNS. Rather we speak of a correspondence. It is like when modeling
the movement of a weight on a spring on earth. The main driving forces in this
movement are gravitation and the tension of the spring. However, this does not
fully determine a final equilibrium if we do not enter in more details taking into
account friction and the like. It is in the same spirit that we should interpret the
above mentioned correspondence.
4 Complexity, Evolution and our Cognitive Toolkit
Fodor has postulated a principle concerning our language. It says that (see [5])
the structure and vocabulary of our language is such that it is efficient in de-
scribing our world and dealing with the frame problem. The frame problem is
an important problem in artificial intelligence which deals with the problem how
to describe the world in an efficient way so that after a change in the state of
affairs no entirely new description of the world is needed. See for example [11].
In particular, Fodor considers particles that can be either frigeons or non-
frigeons. A particle is a frigeon if Fodors refrigerator happens to stand open and
otherwise it is a nonfrigeon. It is clear that we can perfectly well define such con-
cepts and words. However, the mere availability of these concepts will not help
us understand the world better. Nor are we likely to be able to act better in a
competitive setting by having access to these concepts. And what is even worse,
our description of the world becomes very cumbersome if we take these concepts
into account. In particular of course at moments when Fodor’s refrigerator is
either opened or closed.
Based on this thought experiment Fodor posed the thesis that our language
–an essential part of our cognitive toolkit– has evolved in such a way to efficiently
describe the world and the important changes occurring therein.
On a similar page, we would like to suggest that our cognitive toolkit has
evolved over the course of time so that it best deals with the processes it needs
to deal with. Now, by PCE these processes are either universal or very simple.
Thus, it seems to make sense in terms of evolution to have a cognitive toolkit
that is well-suited to deal with just two kinds of processes: the very simple ones
and the universal ones.
Taking these considerations into account, it can well be conceved that there
actually are computational processes out there that violate PCE but firstly, by
GNS these processes will be very scarce and secondly, even if they are out there,
our cognitive toolkit is just not well-equipped enough to deal with them.
Actually, throughout mathematics and mathematical logic there are various
indications present that seem to substantiate the claim that indeed many of our
most commonly used intellectual and cognitive tools within these fields, although
rather sophisticated, all fall in one of few classes of operational strength. In
this paper we have already seen that it is very hard to get sets that are not
computationally universal. In [6] we gave some more examples to this same
phenomenon.
In this setting we would also like to mention the program of reverse math-
ematics (see [12]). Reverse mathematics tries to gauge the logical strength of
important mathematical theorems. One starts out with some weak base the-
ory T0. Next, one considers some important mathematical theorem τ . These are
typically mathematical theorems that are frequently used by the mathematical
community.
We mention here some examples of such theorems without further reference,
context or proof. They just serve to give the flavor of the kind of theorems
considered:
– Every countable commutative ring has a prime ideal;
– A continuous real function on the closed unit interval is Riemann integrable;
– Uniqueness of algebraic closure (of a countable field);
– Go¨del’s completeness theorem: a formula ϕ in a countable language is prov-
able from a set Γ of assumptions in that same language, if and only if ϕ is
true in every model where all of Γ is true.
As said, we do not want to go into the details of these theorems. They merely
serve the purpose of illustrating what kind of theorems are considered and how
wildly divers the scope of these different theorems are. The next step in the
recursive mathematics project is to consider the system T0 + τ , that is, the base
system together with one of those particular mathematical theorems. We call
two such systems T0 + τ and T0 + τ
′ equivalent and write T0 + τ ≡ T0 + τ ′, if
they prove exactly the same set of theorems, that is,
T0 + τ ` ϕ ⇐⇒ T0 + τ ′ ` ϕ
for any formula ϕ. It turns out that almost all important mathematical theorems
fall into one of five equivalent systems. That is to say, if you take six arbitrary
important mathematical theorems {τi | i ∈ {1, . . . , 6}}, almost surely you will
have that T0 + τi ≡ T0 + τj for some i 6= j. We think that this is an important
indication of the fact that our intellectual/cognitive toolkit is designed in such a
way as to efficiently/naturally recognize, and deal with a limited set of problems
that are most useful to us in our daily life and fight for survival. In particular
we mention that all the above mentioned examples of important mathematical
theorems are equivalent over some natural base theory T0.
5 On testing the Generalized Natural Selection principle
In this final section we shall address the question on how to test the principle
of Generalized Natural Selection GNS as put forward in [6] and discussed here
in Section 3. As mentioned before, such tests can never substitute a full proof.
Rather they can merely supply “circumstantial evidence” in favor of or against
the principle. Let us start out by pointing out some subtleties underlying GNS.
5.1 General observations
The principle GNS tells us that complex processes are more likely to be more
successful than others and thus more likely to “survive”. Let us recall the exact
formulation of GNS and make some general observations that should always be
taken into account when studying it.
GNS: In nature, computational processes of high computational sophis-
tication are more likely to maintain/abide than processes of lower com-
putational sophistication provided that sufficiently many resources are
around to sustain the processes.
In this formulation we see the following difficulties naturally emerge.
1. The first, most natural, and most fundamental question is “what is deter-
mining the identity of a process”. For example, suppose some process Π
undergoes some minimal change, should we still call it the same process Π
after that minimal change? The same sort of question arises in all kinds of
sciences: “is a human being without limbs still a human being?” or “when is
a particular cloud a Nimbo Cumulus?”. It turns out even to be difficult to
classify life within very broad categories like “animal” versus “plant” etc.
Naturally the question is related to deep philosophical questions relating,
amongst others, to issues like fuzziness (see e.g., [15]) in particular and the
Sorites paradox more in general ([7]). The Sorites paradox deals with ques-
tions like “how many trees should there be to form a forest, and what happens
if I would cut one tree”.
When trying to make quantified statements about GNS one should always
first isolate a well defined entity that substitutes either “process” or some
essential property representing the process. In the paradigm of The selfish
gene this is easy but in the paradigm of GNS this is not.
2. A second fundamental question is concerning what is meant by complexity
and in particular how to measure it. As mentioned before, there are various
essentially different definitions throughout the literature and we have put
forward our own proposal here in Section 1.
3. We think that the two problems mentioned so far are the more serious ones.
Minor but not less fundamental problems arise in also defining the other
mentioned concepts. Thus, how should we specify probability when saying
that one process is more likely to maintain/abide than another. What is
exactly understood by interaction, etc.
5.2 Mathematical analysis
In principle one could try to formulate GNS in a fully formalized setting and
then try to prove GNS as a theorem within that formal setting. In doing so
all above mentioned points/problems should be taken into account. We shall
shortly see how many choices such an analysis entails. That naturally raises the
questions on how natural these choices are and in how much the final analysis
says something about the physical reality at all.
For example, one could identify a process by a set, or better, by a Turing
degree X. This would be a first choice. In a next choice one has to define some
mathematical operation ⊕ between two degrees that models the notion of inter-
action between two processes aka degrees. Thus, the outcome of two processes
X and Y that interacted would be denoted and computed by X ⊕ Y .
Subsequently, we can answer the question whether X ≤ X ⊕ Y and Y ≤
X ⊕ Y . However, if we wish to say something on how likely it is that either
X ≤ X ⊕ Y or Y ≤ X ⊕ Y we need to make yet more choices like introducing
some probabilistic tools on the space of degrees between ∅ and ∅′.
5.3 Testing in the Laboratory
Instead of mathematical modeling, one can also try to isolate some real-world
processes that can be considered naturally as computational ones and have them
interact and run in a laboratory setting. Also here, all the difficulties as discussed
in Section 5.1 will manifest themselves in this setting.
In particular we will have to decide on the identity determining aspects of
the processes involved. Moreover we have to decide on the measure of complexity
that is to be applied to these processes. Probably that is the harder and more
arbitrary task in this setting.
When working with living organisms some care has to be taken as to prevent
that we are just testing the well-established principle of natural selection instead
of GNS.
5.4 Computer simulations
In this final section we shall discuss a possible approach to test GNS via com-
puter simulations. Again we should settle upon choices for the modeling problems
as posed in 5.1.
Just as with the mathematical modeling, we would like to stay as close as
possible to the physical reality in our computer simulations. Due to the inherent
parallel nature of physical reality (all goes on at the same time) and due to the
locality of causality it seems a good idea to simulate parts of reality by cellular
automata (CA).
For the sake of a simple presentation let us briefly recall the definition of one
of the simplest CAs: a one-dimensional CA with radius 1 and two symbols. We
shall depict the two different symbols by black and white respectively. Our CA
acts on a one dimensional tape of discrete cells that extend infinitely both to the
left and to the right. In CAs, time evolution is modeled by discrete time steps.
An initial condition is given by telling what cell is of what color. The color of
each cell will evolve over time. Basically our CA is just a look-up table with a
rule how to compute the color of a particular cell at a next time step depending
on its current color and the color of its two direct neighbors. An example of such
a CA is depicted in Figure 1.
Fig. 1. Definition of Rule 110
The rule numbering is according to a numbering scheme as presented in [14]
but not really relevant for the current presentation. Thus, for example, if a cell
was white at time t and both its neighbors were black at time t, then at the next
step t+1, the cell will turn black according to the defining look-up table of Rule
110.
As in [14] we depict the consecutive tape configurations from top to down.
Thus, for example, if we start out with just a single black cell on an otherwise
white tape, Rule 110 will give us the famous evolution as depicted in Figure 2
below.
It is evident from Figure 2 that complex behavior can already occur in these
simple automata. As a matter of fact, it is know that Rule 110 is universal in
that it can –in some sense– emulate any other computational process. It is easy
to see how CA can be generalized to more symbols, more dimensions and larger
radii (taking more neighbors into account).
To come back to our test of GNS and in the setting of CAs, how should
we model processes? Should a process be modeled by a particular CA? And if
so, how should interaction be modeled? We think it is more natural to model a
process by an initial condition. Let us briefly explain why.
We have reasoned before that there is a strong analogy between physical
reality and CAs. Each cell in a CA with its respective symbol can be seen
as a particular property of physical reality at some particular locus or region.
The interaction between these properties at these regions are governed by the
same laws of nature everywhere throughout the universe. At least it is generally
believed to be the case that the laws of physics are the same throughout the
universe.
One could not wish to adhere to this believe and keep the possibility open
that somewhere far away in extreme circumstances –for example close to a black
hole– the laws of physics do change. However, it still seems reasonable to expect
the laws of nature to be at least locally stable. And as we are interested on
interacting processes it is mainly local interaction that we are interested in. Thus,
if we have a CA simulating physical reality, it should be the same CA at every
part of the tape. Moreover, if we wish to simulate reality in which universality
Fig. 2. Evolution of Rule 110 starting with just one black cell and computed only for
700 steps. Figure generated with Mathematica.
clearly occurs, we better start out with a universal CA1. Pushing the analogy
further we are lead to accept that processes correspond to the configuration of
our symbols evolving over time.
It is in this setting that the question about the defining properties of a
particular process becomes very hard. Thus, in simulations using CAs it seems
more fruitful to focus on particular features of a process rather than to find a
set of defining properties that sharply tells us what a particular process is. For
the moment we shall not address the issue of limited resources.
So now that we have identified a process with an initial condition the problem
of finding a suitable definition of complexity becomes clearly defined. Remember
that we propose to work first with one-dimensional CAs with just two symbols.
Thus, a process is nothing but a string developing over time for which there
are suitable and effective complexity measures defined (see [3] or [16]). By brute
force simulations one can now try to quantify how likely it is that the more
complex processes maintain/abide.
Even if these simulations could provide circumstantial evidence in favor of
GNS, one still has to be very careful in how to interpret the repercussions of
these simulations on the physical reality. However, positive outcomes of such sim-
ulations, experiments, or theorems will certainly help gain credibility of GNS.
1 This requirement can be relaxed as a universal CA can mimic any other CA too.
Further credibility could be obtained by applications of GNS in related theo-
retical frameworks and only time will tell if these are to be found or not.
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